



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

of reason and ripeness of judgment in a distracted world, the shortcomings of the philosopher impress one as a genuine calamity. In this age, that is productive at once of savage brutalities, ingenious sophistries in defense of outworn traditions, unprecedented greed for material goods and alarming increase of control by unintelligent and fanatical minorities, what indeed promises salvation but the development of those qualities that Professor Gardiner hailed as the product of the philosophic habit and temper of mind: poise and moderated passion and prejudice; and ability to clarify ideas, to reconcile apparent contradictions and to formulate and develop ideals? If philosophers, set somewhat apart by training and by natural concern for the generic and unchanging aspect of things, are themselves unsure of their function, at variance regarding method, and inclined, any of them, to doubt the worth of those intellectual interests which it is their task to guard and cherish—then indeed is the outlook for the future even darker and more ominous than the facts of contemporary history incline one to fear.

HELEN HUSS PARKHURST.

BARNARD COLLEGE.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Religious Consciousness: A Psychological Study. JAMES BISSETT PRATT. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1920. Pp. x + 488.

This "study" is in fact a general work on the psychology of religion. The contents range from a preliminary analysis of the notion of religion and of the psychology of religion through a discussion of the subconscious and of society and the individual to the specific topics of religious growth, conversion and revivals, belief in God and in immortality, the cult, prayer, and mysticism. The plan of the work differs in three respects from that of others in which much the same topics appear: First, mysticism receives especially full treatment (almost a third of the book); second, the material is drawn almost exclusively from highly developed religions; third, within this field the author's policy tends toward fulness of descriptive detail rather than toward the finally adequate analysis that includes origins and early forms.

Certain unquestionably excellent results have been achieved by this unusual plan. In particular, the work is unique for range and variety of data within its chosen field, and for sympathetic appreciation of diverse types of religious belief and practise. Professor Pratt has taken pains to obtain first hand knowledge of such facts not only in our western environment but also in India, and he has consistently

endeavored to discover how each situation looks through the eyes of the person whom he observes. His reading of religious literature is similarly catholic in range and in spirit.

A general work of this character is certain, of course, to contain much material that is the common property of psychologists. Concerning Pratt's presentation of this material it is sufficient to say that he has given it attractive and often popular form. The technical psychologist will, of course, look beyond this to what is less usual, and especially to anything that is debatable. Among the fresh leads that he will find are the following:

1. Correction of one-sidedness in western conceptions of religious life in India. For example, Pratt finds a vital belief in immortality among all classes in India *except* those that have come under western influence, and he has a succinct explanation for the fact (248-250). He points out, too, that the majority of Indian mystics emphasize personality (471, f.).

2. A penetrating analysis of the causes of decline in the belief in immortality in our western world (238, ff.).

3. Ascertainment of a type of conversion, objective-minded and sometimes intellectual, that has been generally overlooked by psychologists because they have incautiously taken their lead from evangelical theology and customs (122-140).

4. Evidence that one function of the cult, from the standpoint of the worshipper himself and not merely from that of the priest, is renewal and confirmation of the religious attitude (271-278), so that religion here appears as evaluation of itself, a process of self-involution.

5. Careful exposition of the specific differences and relations between objective worship, which seeks to produce changes in the deity, and subjective worship, which aims at effects in the worshipper himself (Chap. XIV).

Among the debated and debatable points are:

1. Pratt strenuously opposes Ames's general view of functional psychology as inclusive of theology and philosophy, and particularly his reduction of the meaning of God to "idea of God." But, for some almost inscrutable reason, Pratt does not himself come to close quarters with the distinction between structural and functional analysis of religious experiences. His most common schema is structural—the exhibition at each point of four factors or types, the traditional, the rational, the mystical, and the practical or moral (14, ff.). Values are indeed mentioned, but there is neither classification of them, nor indication of their origins, or of how they change within our changing experience (see, for example, 271). His definition of

religion at the outset makes it "the serious and social attitude of individuals or communities toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies" (2). The perspective here is functional and it is social; it has to do with attitudes, interests, destiny, control. In the remainder of the book, however, "interests" receive scant notice,¹ and God becomes simply the "determiner of destiny." The notion of control, too, at least as far as it concerns this life, is limited almost entirely to subjective reinforcement of desires of which there is nowhere a thorough exposition. The term "social attitude" in the definition justifies an expectation that religion will be treated as an incorporation of social values most of all. Instead of this the social aspect of religion appears in the main body of the book almost if not quite exclusively as imitation, institutionalism, and traditionalism—structural aspects merely.

2. The author undertakes to give a description of the religious consciousness in the full scientific sense of description, which is inclusive of generalization and explanation (29). He seems to assume that such description is possible without reference to genetic problems. "We are not at all concerned . . . with the origin of the belief in a God or gods. . . . Our questions are the less speculative and hopeful ones, Why do people continue to believe in God, and what are the psychological factors that influence or determine the meaning of that term" (200)? This passage is followed by exposition of the difference between dogmatic and popular ideas of God, discrimination between rational and imaginative factors, and exhibition of the four types of belief (see 1 above). But the content of the idea of God, and why this content stirs men's minds at all are hardly mentioned. We are thus left with no real explanation of why men believe in God. The main reason for this deficiency, I judge, lies in Pratt's determination to keep clear of origins. It is almost as if one who desires to know the psychology of private property should limit his study to the drawing and signing of a title deed.

3. Finally, debatable ground is taken in a number of details. (a) The products of dissociation are said to be always limited and inferior (59), whereas one of the harder problems of the subconscious grows out of the invention, sometimes amounting to artistic creation, that has appeared in several dissociated consciousnesses. (b) Pratt accepts James's notion of ideo-motor action, and bases a theory of religious self-expression upon it. The point of Thorndike's criticisms of this theory, that the particular act that accom-

¹ What is it, for instance, that a Hindu widow hopes for when she makes offerings before the *lingam* of the "Great God," and what is the content of the faith that is strengthened by this act? See page 274.

panies an idea has become attached to it through previous experience, seems to have been missed (95; 169, note 10). (c) The doctrine that an extreme break between childhood and adolescence is normal—"out of thinghood into selfhood" (108)—appears to reflect a theory that is losing ground. (d) The primary cause of the cult is found in a cosmic sense (of *mana*) that is produced by natural phenomena (260, ff.). This opinion will have to reckon with Campbell's recent re-study of *mana* from which she concludes that this idea expresses the experience of heightened power that one has when one acts with a group, and that *mana* is not impersonal. Several recent investigations, moreover, dealing with widely diverse bodies of fact, converge upon the view that religious experience is at its core continuous with men's experience of one another (see *Psy. Bul.*, Vol. 17, No 3, March, 1920, pp. 95-99). (e) Pratt leaves us in doubt concerning his view of some factors of original nature. He speaks of an instinct of self-assertion (230 *et passim*), but intimates that there may be something of the sort still deeper than instinct. One wonders what this something is. He speaks also of an instinct of self-expression (268, 278), the nature and the existence of which surely need to be established. There is, apparently, a "spiritual nature" (479), and some persons have a "natural tendency toward mysticism" (359). Both concepts need clarification. (f) Owing, no doubt, to the fact that the book has been in process for more than twelve years, so that, as the Preface explains, several distinct strata of thought are superimposed upon one another, one or two inconsistencies are visible, one of them an important one. It is declared at the beginning that a mystical factor is present in "every genuinely religious person" (14), but at the end the author says that "many truly religious people are emphatically not mystical, and mysticism is by no means essential to religion" (477). There is apparently a similar confusion with regard to tribal initiations (263, 289).

GEORGE A. COE.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

Little Essays Drawn from the Writings of George Santayana.

LOGAN PEARSALL SMITH. (With the collaboration of the author.)

New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1920. Pp. ii + 290.

The compiler of these extracts from Mr. Santayana's volumes explains his undertaking as follows: "The origin and purpose of this book can be briefly stated. Ever since I became acquainted with Mr. Santayana's writings, I have been in the habit of taking up now and then one or another of his volumes, finding in them, among many things that, being no philosopher, I did not understand, much writing